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THE TICK OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CLOCK-
HOW THE FRCD PREEMPTS THE STATE LAW ACCRUAL
DATE IN FREIER V WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
I. INTRODucriON
Toxic waste landfills pose significant health risks to neighbor-
ing communities and introduce complex political questions about
how this country should manage its hazardous waste.' In the 1950s,
the chemical industry recognized that abandoned landfills could
potentially leach dangerous materials into the environment.2 This
country, however, did not confront the issue of toxic waste until the
late 1970s, with publicized incidents such as Valley of the Drums
and Love Canal.3 In response to public concern about environ-
mental and human health threats posed by hazardous waste, Con-
gress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980. 4 Congress de-
1. See Kristen Chapin, Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health Data, and the Evolv-
ing Common Law: Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVi-r. L. 129, 129 (1993) (discussing societal implications and pub-
lic health risks of toxic waste landfills); Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. West-
chester County, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting serious political
questions exist concerning hazardous waste disposal); see also Jeffrey Spear, Stu-
dent Article, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsibilities to Future Genera-
tions, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 119-20 (1993) (discussing current debate
surrounding toxic waste landfills and impact of dumping today on future
generations).
2. See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. at 1045-46 (describing lack
of "scientific know-how" in early twentieth century and failure to recognize envi-
ronmental threat posed by toxic waste "time-bombs"); United States v. Hooker
Chem. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 1048-50 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting state of
knowledge and industrial practices in 1940s and 1950s).
3. SeeJames R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individ-
ual Causation, 18 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217, 254-55 (2000/2001) (describing
recognition of toxic waste dump problems). Valley of the Drums "involved a vast
quantity of illegally disposed material" and "was one of the earliest and most seri-
ous hazardous waste sites;" it motivated Congress to develop the Superfund law.
EPA EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM, Photos - Valley of the Drums, at http://www.epa.
gov/superfund/programs/er/resource/dl_06.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2002);
see Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 n.4 (E.D. Tenn. 1996)
(describing events that occurred at Valley of the Drums). Love Canal involved a
public health crisis resulting from the burial of chemical wastes in the Love Canal
landfill during the 1970s. See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680
F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2001) [hereinafter CERCLA] (establishing federal
program to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout United States);
(41)
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signed CERCLA as a long-range approach to remedy the adverse
consequences of improper disposal, improper transportation, and
improperly maintained or closed disposal sites. 5
Past disposal practices required immediate attention and the
original CERCLA legislation rendered unsatisfactory. 6 Some re-
strictive state limitation statutes barred parties from bringing CER-
CIA claims because the statutes began to run at the time of the first
injury instead of when the party "discovered" that a hazardous sub-
stance caused the injury.7 In response, Congress enacted and su-
perimposed the "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986" (SARA) into CERCLA.8 Unlike the original CERCLA legis-
lation, SARA provided new enforcement tools to seek recovery from
responsible persons.9 To ensure that injured parties did not forfeit
their claims, SARA amended CERCLA section 309 (42 U.S.C.
§ 9658) and provided a federally required commencement date
(FRCD).10 The FRCD preempts state statutes of limitation if (1)
the claims are based on hazardous substance releases and (2) the
state limitations period provides a commencement date earlier
than federal law.11
see Spear, supra note 1, at 119 (noting importance of Love Canal in enactment of
CERCLA and Congressional motivation behind CERCLA generally).
5. See Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 757 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (discussing
CERCLA provisions regarding ongoing pollution) (quoting INJURIES AND DAMAGES
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES; A Re-
port to Congress in Compliance with Section 301 (e) of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982)); see also Spear, supra note 1, at 119 (commenting on CERCLA's long-range
goals).
6. See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. at 1045 (discussing indis-
criminate past dumping practices and addressing need to alter hazardous waste
disposal in future).
7. See JAMES T. O'REILLY & CAROLINE B. BUENGER, RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A
PRACTICE GUIDE WITH FORMS § 9:17 (2d ed. 2003) (describing problems with re-
strictive state limitations statutes). Statutes of limitation determine when an in-
jured party may bring a hazardous substance exposure claim. See generally, BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1422-23 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "statute of limitations").
8. See generally Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1327 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting
enactment of SARA and its subsequent effect on CERCLA).
9. See EPA SUPERFUND, SARA Overview, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
action/law/sara.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2003) (describing SARA's additions
and changes to CERCLA legislation); see also MacAyeal, supra note 3, at 254-55
(discussing enactment of Superfund legislation).
10. See Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2002)
(noting SARA's creation of uniform starting date for statutes of limitation to run);
see also Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA] (extending CERCLA goals); 42
U.S.C. § 9658 (discussing fully FRCD).
11. SeeAngeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer &Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 599 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (explaining circumstances where FRCD preempts state statutes of
[Vol. XV: p. 41
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CERCLA allows the federal government to successfully respond
to this country's toxic waste problem by making "those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the
costs of remedying the harmful condition they created." 12 For ex-
ample, Freier v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.13 involved Pfohl Landfill
(Landfill), identified by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) as an "uncontrolled hazardous waste site."1 4 When the Land-
fill was active, operators (defendants) buried waste in drums and
"into excavated areas of the facility. 1 5 More than sixty people
(plaintiffs) alleged that they received personal injuries from toxic
substances stored in the Landfill. 16 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted the FRCD discovery-of-cause standard, which
defines the time at which any statute of limitation runs as "the date
the [claimant] knew (or reasonably should have known) that the
personal injury" was caused or affected by hazardous materials. 17
The Second Circuit held that triable issues of fact existed regarding
when the plaintiffs reasonably should have known that the Landfill
materials caused their injuries.' 8
This Note examines CERCLA statutory authority concerning
FRCD accrual dates for the preemption of statutes of repose and
limitation. 19 Section II of this Note begins with a brief summary of
limitation) (quoting Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding & Tank Serv., Inc.,
530 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
12. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986) (noting CERCLA's creation of accountability standards for parties
dealing with toxins) (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)); see State v. Motorola, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 566,
569 (D. Ariz. 1991) (discussing "tools" given to federal agencies by Congress to
address toxic issues in CERCLA).
13. 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002).
14. See generally EPA OFFCE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, Auxil-
iary Information: National Priorities List, Proposed Rule and Final Rule, Internet Volume
6, Number 1, 51 (2003), at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/auxil.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2003) (listing sites EPA considers as uncontrolled hazardous waste
sites).
15. EPA REGION 2 CONG. DIST. 30, Pfohl Brothers Landfill NPL Listing History, 1
(2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/0201751c.pdf
(last visited Nov. 23, 2003) (giving detailed site description of Landfill activities
and contents).
16. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 183 (discussing plaintiffs' personal-injury claims ad-
dressed by Second Circuit).
17. Id. at 184 (providing definition of FRCD and noting that it provides stan-
dard date for start of statute of limitations period) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9658(b) (4) (a)).
18. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182 (noting court's interpretation of date when
plaintiffs should have known they were injured by Landfill).
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the facts of Freier.20 Section III explains relevant case law surround-
ing CERCLA and the FRCD. 21 Section IV discusses the Freier court's
analysis of relevant statutory language and case law.22 Section V
analyzes whether the Second Circuit's determination was proper.23
Finally, section VI of this Note evaluates the impact of the Freier
court's holding regarding the FRCD's authority under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9658.24
II. FACTS
In Freier, the Landfill owned and operated by third-party de-
fendants Pfohl Brothers and Pfohl Enterprises in Cheektowaga,
New York allegedly caused the plaintiffs to develop cancer. 25 The
Pfohl Landfill covers 120 acres and borders Aero Lake's fishing and
swimming site. 26 Three tributaries flow through the Landfill and
feed Ellicott Creek, which is within a few hundred feet of the
Landfill. 2 7
The plaintiffs filed complaints in the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York between 1995 and
1997.28 The plaintiffs alleged that exposure to toxic waste depos-
20. For a discussion of the facts of Freier, see infra notes 25-42 and accompany-
ing text.
21. For a discussion of CERCLA and the statutory and judicial background of
section 309 (42 U.S.C. § 9658), see infra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
22. For a narrative analysis of the Freier decision, see infra notes 107-69 and
accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Freier decision, see infra notes 170-93 and ac-
companying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Freier decision on federal jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
25. See Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2002)
(discussing plaintiffs and third-party defendants involved in suit).
26. See id. at 182 (explaining Landfill's rough geography and details of envi-
rons around Landfill). When the Landfill was in operation, it accepted "solid and
liquid chemical wastes and sludges, including heavy metals ... and volatile organic
compounds (VOCs)," from area businesses that used petroleum and solvents. EPA
REGION 2 CONG. DIST. 30, supra note 15, at 1. A fence restricted access to most of
the site; drainage ditches with runoff from the Landfill, however, were outside of
the fenced area and accessible to the public. Id.
27. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182 (describing Landfill and connections to creeks).
Several drainage ditches discharged into Ellicott Creek, a body of water used by
the community for recreational fishing. See EPA REGION 2 CONG. DIsT. 30, supra
note 15, at 1. Ellicott Creek intersects with the Niagara River, an international
waterway between Canada and the United States. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182-83.
28. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182-83 (discussing plaintiffs' complaints and claims
asserted under New York State law). Some of the claims were survival claims filed
on behalf of decedents. See id. at 183.
[Vol. XV: p. 41
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ited in the Landfill caused the parties to develop cancer. 29 Most
plaintiffs had lived, worked or recreated near the Landfill. 30 Be-
tween 1946 and 1969, the defendant companies sent hazardous
waste materials from their manufacturing operations and deposited
them into the Landfill.3l
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' state law tort claims
for personal injuries as untimely.3 2 The court ruled that, under
CERCLA, the plaintiffs' claims accrued when they "knew or with
reasonable diligence should have known" that exposure to the
Landfill's hazardous substances caused their injuries.33 The court
29. See id. at 183 (noting that actions were consolidated in district court). The
plaintiffs filed state law survival, wrongful death, personal injury and loss-of-consor-
tium claims. See id. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages us-
ing strict liability, negligence, gross negligence and failure to warn theories. See id.
The plaintiffs asserted federal jurisdiction by showing diversity of citizenship. See
id. New York law governed the plaintiffs' claims in all areas where federal law did
not preempt them. See id.
30. See id. (discussing multiple ways that plaintiffs or decedents were exposed
to toxins in Landfill). Some plaintiffs used the Landfill as ingress to Aero Lake.
See id. Some of the plaintiffs' children played in the Landfill. See id. Also, when
Ellicott Creek overflowed, adjacent residential properties were flooded. See id.
The candidates in the Cheektowaga State Assemblyman elections confronted the
environmental issues surrounding the Pfohl Brothers Landfill during the cam-
paign. See generally State Assemblyman, CHEEKTOWAGA TIMEs, Nov. 2, 2000, available
at http://www.cheektowagatimes.com/News/2O0O/1102/Political/02.html (last
visited July 29, 2003) (noting community environmental issues and their central
role in local politics). Moreover, the Landfill "has been listed in the New York
State Registry of Active Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites" since 1983. Freier, 303
F.3d at 183.
31. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 183 (citing defendants' 23-year use of Landfill as
repository for hazardous waste). The plaintiffs alleged that exposure to ambient
hazardous substances released from the Landfill or those released during trans-
port to the Landfill caused the cancer. See id. When the Landfill was active, "oper-
ators buried some of this waste in drums and placed the remaining wastes directly
into excavated areas of the facility." EPA REGIoN 2 CONG. DIsT. 30, supra note 15,
at 1. As of July 6, 2000, between 5,000 and 6,000 drums had been removed from
the Landfill. See Aero to Stay Open Until Cleanup is Set, CHEEKTOWAGA TIMEs, July 6,
2000, available at http://www.cheektowagatimes.com/News/2000/0706/Front-
Page/01.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
32. Freier, 303 F.3d at 182 (discussing action in district court and its justifica-
tions for dismissing plaintiffs' claims).
33. See id. (noting district court's grant of partial summary judgment). After
discovery limited to questions regarding the statute of limitations, the defendants
moved for partial summary judgment in two stages to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims
on grounds that they were untimely. See id. at 184. Then, in June 1997, the de-
fendants sought dismissal of the wrongful death, survival and loss-of-consortium
claims. See id. The defendants believed the plaintiffs' survival claims were barred
by CPLR section 214(5)'s three-year limitations period because the relevant first
exposures to hazardous waste occurred no later than 1968, and the suits com-
menced beginning in 1995. See id. at 184-85. The defendants contended that
CPLR section 214-c(2)'s three-year limitations period ran from either the date of
the injury's discovery or from the date that the injury should have reasonably been
discovered, whichever was earlier. See id. at 185. Based on these dates, the defend-
5
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found that the plaintiffs should have suspected the cause of their
injuries no later than the end of 1991. 3 4 The court further con-
cluded that, even under 42 U.S.C. § 9658, the relevant statute of
limitations barred the plaintiffs' claims asserted in 1995.3 5
ants also contended that almost all remaining survival claims would be barred. See
id. The defendants felt similarly about the wrongful death claims, suggesting that
they were barred because they arose two years after decedents' deaths, and that
underlying loss of consortium claims could not be maintained. See id. The defend-
ants further argued that the FRCD did not apply to claims related to deaths other
than those of the plaintiffs. See id. They also argued using the FRCD was unconsti-
tutional because the preemption of state laws regarding accrual dates for causes of
action and state statutes of limitation exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause pow-
ers and violated the Tenth Amendment. See id.
In opposing the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs asserted that, in
accordance with the FRCD, their survival and wrongful death claims "accrued no
earlier than the date on which they knew or reasonably should have known the
cause of the injuries, arguing that the FRCD preempts state law with respect to the
dates on which their claims accrued if state law would use an earlier date." Id. The
plaintiffs argued that, before Doctors Rigle and Sawyer wrote the "Pfohl Environ-
mental Health Study" on December 19, 1994, the plaintiffs should not be charged
with knowledge of the cause of their injuries. See id. The study concluded that
.persons frequenting the vicinity of the Landfill had an increased risk of develop-
ing cancers, including cancers of the types suffered by [the] plaintiffs and their
decedents, because of the toxic wastes stored at the Landfill." See id.
On October 27, 1998, in In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 26 F. Supp. 2d 512
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (Pfohl 1), the district court granted the defendants' motion in part
and denied it in part. See id. at 185-86. The court found that if federal law did not
apply, the plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival claims would be time-barred. See
id. The district court ruled that if state law set an earlier accrual date, § 9658
would be triggered and the FRCD would preempt state law toxic tort claim accrual
dates. See id. at 186. After analysis, the court maintained that the FRCD super-
seded New York's date of death accrual date for toxic tort claims. See id. The court
also denied the defendants' challenges to the constitutionality of the FRCD, as well
as the defendants' motion to dismiss survival claims asserted prior to December 19,
1995. See id. at 186-87. All later claims were dismissed. See id. at 187. Additionally,
the court rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss wrongful death claims be-
cause they were timely, and consequently the loss-of-consortium claims were saved.
See id.
34. See id. at 182 (setting time when plaintiffs should have suspected cause of
their injuries).
35. See id. (justifying district court conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were
barred by statute of limitations). In November 1997, the defendants filed a second
motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal
injury claims. See id. at 187. The defendants argued that those claims were barred
by the one-year statute of limitations because they accrued at the end of 1991 at
the latest, when sufficient information existed to put a reasonable person on no-
tice to determine whether a causal connection existed between the Landfill and
the plaintiffs' cancer. See id.
To support their constructive notice theory, the defendants submitted official
communications of caution: (1) newspaper articles reporting New York State
(State) Departments of Health (DOH) and Environmental Conservation (DEC)
studies and (2) public concern regarding the possibility of hazardous wastes in the
Landfill. See id. The defendants argued that the public displays and reports were
sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice as to the Landfill's potential health
hazards. See id. at 189. The plaintiffs instead contended that the earliest they
[Vol. XV: p. 41
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The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.3 6 There, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in
ruling that they should have known no later than the end of 1991
that the Landfill caused their injuries.37 The plaintiffs also asserted
that the court incorrectly applied a one-year, instead of a three-
year, limitations period.38
The defendants and third-party defendants cross-appealed to
the Second Circuit.3 9 The Second Circuit held that the district
court appropriately denied the defendants' constitutional and stat-
utory interpretation challenges to 42 U.S.C. § 9658.40 Additionally,
the court determined that the district court correctly found the
plaintiffs' claims subject to the applicable one-year limitations pe-
riod.41 The majority also concluded, however, that there were tria-
could have determined that the Landfill caused their injuries was December 1994
when the Rigle-Sawyer Report was released. See id.
On September 22, 1999, in In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 68 F. Supp. 2d 236
(1999) (Pfohl I1), the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, find-
ing that the "plaintiffs had not 'show[n] . .. that a material issue of fact exists as to
the earliest time when they should have reasonably discovered the cause of their
alleged injury making their claims timely under [CPLR] § 214-c(4) as modified by
§ 9658."' Id. at 193. The Pfohl 1I court determined that the plaintiffs should have
developed "reasonable suspicion" as to the cause of their injuries prior to the end
of 1991 because the defendants' reports were available before the end of 1991. See
id. at 194. Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were time-
barred, and judgment was entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
54(b). See id. at 195; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (announcing rule for judgment
upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties).
36. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182 (noting plaintiffs' appeal to Second Circuit
Court of Appeals).
37. See id. (presenting plaintiffs' contention on appeal that district court
erred as matter of law). The plaintiffs appealed from the district court judgment
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), dismissing claims alleging per-
sonal injuries caused by toxic substances transported to and maintained in the
Landfill. See id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b) (discussing judgment upon multiple
claims or involving multiple parties).
38. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 182 (establishing plaintiffs' contentions on appeal
concerning length of limitations period). The issues on appeal concerned the stat-
utes of limitations regarding the plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 183. There had been
no settlement on the causation issue, and the court expressed no view on the mer-
its of the causation issue. See id.
39. See id. at 195 (detailing defendants' cross-appeals). The defendants and
third-party defendants urged that judgment be affirmed on the ground that 42
U.S.C. § 9658 was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's Commerce
Clause power and violated the Tenth Amendment. See id. The United States ulti-
mately intervened, arguing for § 9658's constitutionality. See id. at 182. The de-
fendants also argued for partial affirmance on the basis that § 9658 does not
pertain to "claims involving the death of a plaintiffs decedent." Id.
40. See id. (addressing court's agreement with district court on statutory inter-
pretation and constitutional issues).
41. See id. (describing court's agreement with district court's ruling that one-
year statute of limitations applied).
7
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ble issues of fact concerning when the plaintiffs reasonably should
have known that the Landfill materials caused their injuries. 42
III. BACKGROUND
A. Enactment of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980.43 CERCLA's purpose was
to remedy the adverse consequences of improper transportation
and disposal, improperly maintained disposal sites, and spills. 44
CERCLA's ultimate statutory goal was "to protect the natural envi-
ronment and save human lives by facilitating the cleanup of envi-
ronmental contamination and imposing costs on the responsible
parties."45 CERCLA supplies federal funding and authority to clean
up hazardous substances and recover costs from parties responsible
for the contamination. 46 In 1986, SARA amended CERCLA to in-
crease State and citizen involvement with site cleanups.47 When a
responsible party is unknown, the EPA administers a trust fund
through CERCLA to pay for cleanups. 48
42. See id. (noting that Second Circuit concluded there were factual issues
remaining concerning date when plaintiffs should have known sources of their
injuries). The Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded
the case for further proceedings. See id.
43. See Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 754 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (noting
enactment of CERCLA); cf United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F.
Supp. 546, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that chemical company was strictly,
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for costs incurred prior to passage and
implementation of CERCLA scheme). See generally United States v. Hooker Chem.
& Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 997-98 (W.D.N.Y 1994) (referring to section
107(a) of CERCLA).
44. See Knox, 690 F. Supp. at 757 (discussing purpose of CERCLA). The 1980
CERCLA required the President to promulgate a National Priorities List (NPL) to
identify the highest priority sites for cleanup. See Diane M. Connolly, Comment,
Successor Landowner Suits for Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: CERCLA Sec-
tion 107(a)(4), 33 UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1744 (1986). The NPL lists sites posing
substantial risk to human health or the environment and helps EPA to determine
which sites should be further investigated. See id. at 1744-45. The Pfohl Brothers
Landfill is listed on the NPL. See EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, supra note 14, at 51.
45. Robert G. Ruggieri, Note, Broward v. Environmental Protection Agency:
CERCLA's Bar on Pre-Enforcement Review of EPA Cleanups Under Section 113(h), 13
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 375 (2002) (noting ultimate goal of CERCLA statute).
46. See id. at 381 (assessing CERCLA's resources and goals).
47. See Knox, 690 F. Supp. at 754 (noting that SARA amended CERCLA in
1986); EPA SUPERFUND, SARA Overview, at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/
law/sara.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2003) (describing SARA's additions and
changes to CERCLA legislation).
48. See EPA SUPERFUND, CERCLA Overview, at http://www.epa.gov/super
fund/action/law/cercla.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2003) (describing law and re-
sponse actions that law authorizes). See generally Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325, 1331-
32 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that EPA rules requiring EPA pre-approval before
[Vol. XV: p. 41
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B. Determining When Statutes of Limitation Run for Hazardous
Substance Exposures
1. Purpose of State Statutes of Limitation
State statutes of limitation identify the time in which an injured
party, seeking compensation for injuries, may bring a claim against
the party responsible for the injuries. 49 New York law provides vari-
ous dates on which a toxic tort claim may accrue, including "(1) the
date of the victim's first exposure to the toxic substance, (2) the
date of discovery of the injury .... and (3) the date of discovery of
the injury's cause. '50 For toxic tort claims in New York, the date of
injury is the date of first exposure to the toxic substance. 51 Sections
214(5) and 214-c of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR) govern personal injury or property damage claims, includ-
ing survival claims.52 Section 214-c provides a three-year limitations
period for personal injury claims caused by hazardous substances. 53
Additionally, Section 214-c states that if a party does not bring a
toxic tort claim within three years of the discovery-of-injury date,
the party must show that medical or scientific knowledge "'suffi-
cient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered,
identified or determined within that three-year period."' 54 New
York's Estates, Powers & Trusts Law (EPTL) gives a two-year limita-
private party could obtain Superfund reimbursement for cleanup of hazardous
waste site and limiting pre-approval to action taken at NPL sites did not violate
Superfund legislation); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805
F.2d 1074, 1084 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that party seeking to recover CERCLA
section 107 response costs need not comply with 60-day waiting period when it
does not seek reimbursement of its response costs from Superfund). Pfohl Broth-
ers Landfill site information is available in the EPA Superfund Information Sys-
tems database. See EPA SUPERFUND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, CERCLIS Hazardous
Waste Sites: Pfohl Brothers Landfill Site Information, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/super
cpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0201751 (last updated July 25, 2003).
49. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (defining statute of limita-
tions); cf Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. Westchester County, 686 F. Supp.
1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that when Government litigates corollary en-
forcement effort, parties with suits under Clean Water Act may not "maintain their
actions simply to secure 'personalized' relief").
50. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2002) (discuss-
ing accrual of toxic tort claims under New York law).
51. See id. at 184 (defining date of injury).
52. See id. at 183 (outlining CPLR section 214-5). CPLR section 214-c became
effective in July 1986 and modifies section 214(5). See id. Survival claims are
claims for pre-death injuries to a decedent's person or property. See id.
53. See id. at 184 (noting length of section 214-c limitations period).
54. Id. (discussing CPLR section 214-c provisions) (quoting N.Y. CPLR § 214-
c(4) (McKinney 1990)).
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tions period for wrongful death claims.55 The EPTL limitations pe-
riod commences on the date of the decedent's death.5 6
2. Introduction of Federally Required Commencement Date
Before CERCLA section 309 (42 U.S.C. § 9658) was introduced
by SARA, CERCLA section 301 (e) required a congressional study of
"'the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in
providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused
by the release of hazardous substances into the environment." 57
The study's findings revealed that, due to state law accrual dates,
some state statutes deprived parties of due process.58 With diseases
that lay dormant for years, such as cancer, a party could be barred
from bringing a claim if the limitations period ran at the time of
the first exposure instead of when the party "discovered" that a haz-
ardous substance caused the injury.5 9 The study concluded that the
commencement date of the statute of limitations was more impor-
tant than the duration of the limitations period.60
In 1986, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 9658 to mandate when
the statute of limitations should begin to run if state limitations
commenced before a party determined the cause of his or her in-
jury.61 Section 9658 provides a federally required commencement
date (FRCD) for toxic tort claims. 62 To trigger the FRCD, a toxic
tort action must be based on state law and allege personal injury or
property damage from exposure to hazardous substances, pollu-
tants or contaminants. 63 The FRCD is the "date the [party] knew
(or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or
property damages ... were caused or contributed to by the hazard-
ous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. ' 64 The
55. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 183 (explaining two-year limitations period for
wrongful death claims provided by New York's Estates, Powers & Trusts Law
(EPTL)).
56. See id. (addressing EPTL limitations period).
57. Id. at 199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (e) (1), which describes purpose of
Congressional study).
58. See id. (discussing report by panel of lawyers concerning state law accrual
dates).
59. See id. (noting congressional committee findings).
60. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (discussing conclusion of
study).
61. See id. (addressing reason for FRCD development).
62. See id. (discussing provision of FRCD for toxic tort actions under § 9658).
63. See id. (describing FRCD under CERCLA section 309).
64. Freier, 303 F.3d at 199 (defining Congressional intent and purpose of
FRCD); see 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b) (4) (a) (providing definition in statutory form). See
generally Gail Howie Conenello, New York District Court Adopts FRCD for Statute of
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FRCD does not create a separate federal cause of action. 65 Instead,
the FRCD preempts state statutes of limitation if (1) state law claims
are based on hazardous substance releases and (2) the applicable
limitations period provides a commencement date earlier than fed-
eral law. 6
6
3. Federally Required Commencement Date Precedent
a. Constitutional and other challenges
Numerous constitutional challenges and other issues concern-
ing the elements necessary to trigger the FRCD have arisen. 67 One
case challenging the FRCD's constitutionality was Bolin v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.. 6 8 Bolin involved a homeowners' suit against a corporation
for allegedly contaminating a groundwater supply.69 The corpora-
tion argued that the FRCD, which preempted the state's com-
mencement date statute, was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 70 The District Court of
Kansas found that the FRCD was a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power and did not violate the Tenth
Amendment. 71
Another relevant case, Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co.72
demonstrates the interplay between a state statute of limitations
and the FRCD.73 In Tucker, property owners filed federal and state
claims against wood treatment companies that exposed them to
hazardous substances.74 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals de-
nied the companies' motion to restrict the property owners' state
law claims to damage that occurred during the four years preceding
Limitations, 7 NO. 11 N.Y./N.J. ENvrTL. COMPLLANCE UPDATE 4 (1999) (discussing
various aspects of FRCD).
65. See O'REILLv & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (explaining relationship be-
tween FRCD and federal causes of action).
66. Angeles Chem. Co., Inc. v. Spencer & Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 599
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding & Tank
Serv., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
67. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (addressing FRCD case law
characteristics). See generally Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098,
1107 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that CERCIA does not violate Commerce
Clause).
68. Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991).
69. See id. at 697-705 (detailing factual basis of lawsuit).
70. See id. at 705-09 (discussing FRCD constitutionality in toxic tort claim).
71. See id. at 706-09 (finding § 9658 valid under congressional commerce
power, and rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge).
72. Tucker v. S. Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 1994).
73. See id. at 1090 (describing basis of case).
74. See id. at 1090-91 (noting property owners' claims).
11
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their filing. 75 The court discussed the FRCD's effort to "deal with
the inadequacies of many state tort systems regarding the delayed
discovery" of a toxic substance release. 76
Courts have also examined the extent to which parties must
know the identity or concentration of the specific contaminants. 77
In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.,78 a chemical corporation
moved for summary judgment against an industrial site owner's
complaint for costs under CERLCA. 79 The Florida Northern Dis-
trict Court found that the FRCD does not require any particular
threshold or concentration of hazardous substance.80
Defining the limits of the FRCD, First United Methodist Church of
Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co.81 involved a property owner's
claim against a manufacturer.82 The owner brought an action to
recover the removal cost of asbestos-containing plaster produced by
the manufacturer.8 3 Contractors used the plaster to construct the
owner's building in 1961 and for repairs in 1969.84 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that "because CERCLA does not author-
ize response cost recovery actions for removal of asbestos from the
structure of a building," the FRCD did not preempt the Maryland
state law repose period.85 Similarly, the claimant in Covalt v. Carey
Canada Inc.86 was exposed to asbestos in the workplace, and fifteen
years later discovered he had asbestosis and lung cancer.87 The Sev-
75. See id. at 1091-93 (explaining Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision).
76. Id. at 1091 (discussing FRCD effort to deal with inadequacies of state tort
systems).
77. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (noting FRCD case law
characteristics).
78. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla.
1995).
79. See id. at 1119-20 (noting parties in case).
80. See id. at 1125-26 (describing requirements for bringing action under stat-
ute). See generally State v. Motorola, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 566, 576 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(holding that grinding sludge is "hazardous substance" within meaning of
CERCLA).
81. First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co.,
882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989).
82. See id. at 864 (noting who parties were on appeal).
83. See id. (discussing property owner's action to recover cost of removal of
asbestos-containing plaster produced by manufacturer and installed in church).
84. See id. (noting that asbestos-containing plaster was used to construct prop-
erty owner's church from 1961 to 1962 and in repairs performed in 1969).
85. Id. at 869 (holding that FRCD did not preempt Maryland state law repose
period because CERCLA did not authorize recovery for removal of hazardous sub-
stances in interior of buildings).
86. Covalt v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. See id. at 1435 (discussing party's exposure to asbestos in workplace and
later discovery of asbestosis and lung cancer).
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FRCD preempted state
law "only with respect to releases into the environment. '"88 Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, the "interior of a place of employment is
not 'the environment"' for CERCLA purposes.8 9
b. When an individual should "know or reasonably should
know" cause of injuries
Since CERCLA's enactment, courts have developed methods
for determining when parties should "know or reasonably should
know" the cause of their injuries. 90 In many instances, courts have
determined that the standard under state discovery rules is "suspi-
cion."91 In F.P. Woll & Co. v. Fifth & Mitchell Street Corp.,92 a pur-
chaser of real property asserted CERCLA claims against a former
owner whose previous tenants contaminated the property.93 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the
former owner's motion for summary judgment because the pur-
chaser knew more than two years before filing the complaint that a
government agency "suspected" the prior tenants of contaminating
the property.94
In O'Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc.,95 claimants asserted
personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions based
on corporations' release of hazardous pollutants. 96 The District
Court for the Central District of California granted in part and de-
nied in part the corporations' motion for summary judgment.97
The court determined that a person "reasonably knows" about an
injury and its cause when he or she "reasonably suspects" an injury
and its cause. 98
88. Id. at 1436 (noting that FRCD preempts state law only with respect to
environmental releases).
89. Id. at 1439 (determining that Superfund Act regulates "waste dumps and
other leakages 'into the environment'" and that workplace interior is not "'the
environment'" for CERCLA purposes).
90. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (describing court precedent
in determining when claimants should reasonably know of injuries).
91. See id. (describing state discovery rules).
92. F.P. Woll & Co. v. Fifth & Mitchell St. Corp., 48 ERC 1362 (E.D.P.A.
1999).
93. See id. (describing contamination of property).
94. See id. at 1364 (noting that EPA suspected that operations of prior tenants
contributed to contamination at site).
95. O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
96. See id. at 1027 (discussing actions brought by claimants).
97. See id. (noting corporations' summary judgment motion).
98. See id. at 1050-51 (addressing suspicion of cause of injuries).
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Similarly, Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp.99 involved claims against
manufacturers and suppliers of allegedly toxic chemicals and com-
pounds.1 0 0 The California Court of Appeals determined that a stat-
ute of limitations accrues when a party suffers injury and "'suspects
or should suspect that [his or] her injury was caused by wrongdo-
ing."'1 0 1 The Rivas court emphasized that the injured party "'must
go find the facts"' and "'cannot wait for the facts to find [him or]
her.' "102
In In re Asarco/Vashon-Maury Island Litigation,10 3 Asarco argued
that the publicity and environmental effects related to its smelter
operation put the residents of Vashon-Maury Island on constructive
notice of their claims.' 0 4 The Washington Western District Court
concluded that the residents did not receive sufficient notice to
commence the statute of limitations. 10 5 The court found a genuine
issue of fact as to whether publicity surrounding the smelter was
"sufficiently pervasive and notorious to create constructive
knowledge."' 06
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Freier, the plaintiffs argued that the district court errone-
ously ruled that they reasonably should have known the cause of
their injuries before the end of 1991.107 The plaintiffs claimed that
the district court erred in ruling that the federally required com-
mencement date (FRCD) was not later than the end of 1991.108
Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred in
ruling that they were required to file suit within one year after the
99. Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
100. See id. at 506 (describing appellants' claims).
101. Id. at 522 (discussing statute of limitations) (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 751 P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1988)).
102. Id. (noting claimants' responsibilities) (quoting Jolly, 751 P.2d at 928).
103. In re Asarco/Vashon-Maury Island Litig., No. COO-695Z, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7154 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
104. See id. at *6 (discussing Asarco's argument).
105. See id. (noting Asarco's claims).
106. Id. at *22 (noting court's findings).
107. SeeFreierv. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 195 (2d Cir. 2002) (not-
ing plaintiffs' argument that district court erroneously ruled that they should have
known cause of injuries before end of 1991). Justice Kearse wrote for the majority.
See id. at 182. The plaintiffs did not dispute the district court's ruling that New
York law would time-bar their claims if FRCD were not applied. See id. at 195.
108. See id. (asserting Plantiffs' FRCD claim).
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discovery-of-cause date, even if that period would end less than
three years after the discovery-of-injury date.1 09
The defendants and third-party defendants cross-appealed. 11 0
They sought affirmance that the FRCD does not apply to wrongful
death or survival claims.' Also, the defendants argued that the
FRCD exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
violates the Tenth Amendment because it alters state law com-
mencement dates of a statute of limitations period for state law
claims. ' 12
A. Defendants' Statutory Interpretation Challenges
The Second Circuit addressed the defendants' statutory inter-
pretation challenges. 13 The court upheld the district court's rul-
ing that 42 U.S.C. § 9658 encompasses survival and wrongful death
claims under New York law. 114 Concerning the defendants' consti-
tutional challenges to § 9658, the majority determined that enact-
ing the FRCD was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers.' 15 The court also reasoned that the FRCD does not violate
the Tenth Amendment.' 16 Moreover, the Second Circuit found the
plaintiffs' claims subject to the one-year limitations period following
the discovery-of-cause date."17
B. Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Ruling That the FRCD Was Not
Later Than the End of 1991
The Second Circuit next considered the plaintiffs' challenge to
the district court's ruling that the FRCD was not later than 1991.118
109. See id. (discussing applicable discovery-of-cause and discovery-of-injury
dates).
110. See id. (explaining cross-appeal by defendants and third-party defend-
ants).
111. See id. (describing cross-appeals by defendants and third-party defend-
ants).
112. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 195 (discussing reasons why defendants and third-
party defendants argued that FRCD exceeds Congress's powers under Commerce
Clause and violates Tenth Amendment).
113. See id. at 195-200 (addressing defendants' statutory interpretation chal-
lenges).
114. See id. at 197-200 (noting Second Circuit's view of whether § 9658 en-
compasses survival and wrongful death claims).
115. See id. at 203 (providing court's view of FRCD as "valid exercise of Con-
gress's powers under the Commerce Clause" and as necessary to further CERCLA
goals).
116. See id. at 205 (recognizing that FRCD does not violate Tenth Amend-
ment).
117. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 210-11 (discussing length of limitations period).
118. See id. at 205 (introducing plaintiffs FRCD challenges).
15
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The court examined the district court's application of legal stan-
dards and view of the factual record.119 From this examination, the
majority ascertained triable issues of fact existed regarding when
the plaintiffs reasonably should have known the cause of their
injuries. 120
1. The Second Circuit's Examination of the Legal Standards
Applied by the District Court
The Second Circuit determined that the district court errone-
ously imputed to the FRCD "a standard of 'reasonable suspi-
cion."' 121 The court reasoned that the lower court incorrectly
accepted the defendants' argument that reasonable suspicion of an
injury caused by exposure to toxic or hazardous substances is suffi-
cient to trigger the statute of limitations.' 22 The majority rejected
this argument because the FRCD discovery-of-cause standard cen-
tered on actual or imputed knowledge, not on suspicion. 123 The
court noted that mere suspicion could not "be equated with knowl-
edge." 124 Further, the Second Circuit discussed how a claimant's
"reasonable suspicion" that the Landfill caused injuries was not suf-
ficient to find that the claimant "reasonably should have known"
that the Landfill caused injuries. 25 The court concluded that the
119. See id. at 205-11 (providing summary of district court analysis).
120. See id. at 182 (determining when plaintiffs reasonably should have known
that Landfill materials caused injuries).
121. Id. at 205. The court discussed the FRCD "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard. See also, e.g., Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The Pfohl II court stated that the
plaintiffs "should have developed a reasonable suspicion as to the cause of their
injuries prior to the end of 1991." Id. The Pfohl II court found that "given the
volume of information available to the public prior to 1992, [the] plaintiffs could
be expected to reasonably suspect the cause of their cancers before the end of
1991." Id. at 254. Additionally, the Pfohl II court concluded that "no reasonable
trier of fact could find that [the] plaintiffs, had they been reasonably diligent in
inquiring as to the cause of their cancers upon being diagnosed, would not have
discovered sufficient information to develop a reasonable suspicion as to the cause
of such injuries prior to the end of 1991." Id. at 257. The defendants argued that
.a reasonable suspicion . . . is sufficient to trigger a rule of limitations that is predi-
cated on knowledge of a fact or event." Id. at 252.
122. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 205-06 (reasoning that district court incorrectly ac-
cepted defendants' argument that reasonable suspicion of injury is sufficient to
trigger rule of limitations).
123. See id. (discussing FRCD discovery-of-cause standard). The FRCD discov-
ery-of-cause standard is defined as "'the date the [claimant] knew (or reasonably
should have known) that the personal injury"' was caused or contributed to by the
hazardous materials."' Id. at 205.
124. Id. (describing problem with mere suspicion).
125. Id. at 206 (finding that mere suspicion does not equate to knowledge of
injuries).
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district court used a flawed legal standard when interpreting the
FRCD. 126
Under New York's CPLR section 214-c(4), a claimant must
show medical or scientific knowledge regarding the cause-of-in-
jury.127 The majority decided that the district court incorrectly ap-
plied an "impossibility of such knowledge" standard to the CPLR
provision.1 28 The lower court interpreted this standard to require a
claimant to prove that the cause of the injury "could not have been"
determined within three years after the discovery-of-injury date. 129
The Second Circuit determined that this interpretation did not
match the statutory language.1 30 Section 214-c(4) of CPLR asserts
that if an action is not filed within the three-year period, the claim-
ant must show that "technical, scientific or medical knowledge and
information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not
been discovered, identified or determined" before that period
expired.131
Based on the New York practice commentaries, the court dis-
cussed how the New York Legislature "apparently intended . . .
[that] the test should be: Was the requisite scientific knowledge rea-
sonably available to the [claimant] during the three-year discovery
period?"1 32 The Second Circuit considered this the correct inter-
pretation of New York law because the district court's interpretation
would burden a potential claimant in a manner contrary to legisla-
tive intent.133 The majority rejected the idea that the New York
126. See id. (noting legal standard applied by district court).
127. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 206 (explaining New York's CPLR section 214-
c(4)).
128. Id. The court discussed the "standard of impossibility" of knowledge.
See, e.g., Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d 236, 248 (1999) (requiring plaintiffs to show that
state of scientific knowledge was insufficient such that it was not possible to dis-
cover cause of injuries in time to commence present actions "within three years
from the discovery of their cancers"); id. at 257 (failing to establish existence of
material issue of fact that such cause could not have been determined before end
of 1991).
129. Freier, 303 F.3d at 206 (discussing district court's interpretation of
standard).
130. See id. (finding that district court improperly interpreted statutory
language).
131. See id. (discussing statutory meaning). See generally N.Y. CPLR § 214-c(4)
(McKinney 1990) (stating statutory rule).
132. Freier, 303 F.3d at 207 (discussing New York Practice Commentaries). See
generally N.Y. CPLR § 214-c(4) (McKinney 1990) (stating statutory rule).
133. Freier, 303 F.3d at 207. For example, the district court concluded that the
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the "cause-could-not-have-been-determined" stan-
dard because they could have hired experts to prepare an environmental studies
report before the end of 1991. Id. The court determined, however, that the rea-
sonable cost of such a study would have been at least two million dollars. See id.
17
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Legislature's CPLR provision, and even Congress's FRCD "reasona-
bly should have known" standard, referred to scientific knowledge a
claimant could obtain only through expensive studies.1 34
The Second Circuit concluded that the official commentary's
view correctly interpreted that CPLR section 214-c(4) referred only
to "reasonably available" scientific knowledge) 3 5 The majority
found it possible that the New York Legislature wanted to create an
accrual date no earlier than "the date the [claimant] knew or rea-
sonably should have known the cause of the injury," thereby match-
ing the FRCD accrual date. 136 Additionally, the court stated that
even if section 214-c(4)'s scientific knowledge provision requires an
accrual date earlier than the date the claimant knew or reasonably
should have known the cause of injury, the FRCD preempts it.137
2. The Second Circuit's Examination of the District Court's View
of the Factual Record
Based on the district court's view of the factual record, the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the district court incorrectly applied
"the principles applicable to the consideration of a motion for sum-
maryjudgment." 138 Deciding that the FRCD was not later than the
end of 1991, the district court concluded that the defendants' me-
dia and government reports "establish [ed] that a highly publicized
controversy existed within the local community over whether the
Landfill posed a threat to the health and safety of those who re-
sided or worked" in the Landfill vicinity.1 39 The district court
found that these documents should have raised reasonable suspi-
cion regarding the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. 40 Furthermore,
the district court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish "a
material issue of fact that such cause could not have been deter-
mined" before the end of 1991.141
134. Id. (discussing nature and expense of studies).
135. See id. (relating reasonableness standard).
136. See id. (discussing accrual dates in relationship to reasonableness
standard).
137. See id. (noting CPLR section 214-c(4) scientific-knowledge provision).
138. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 207. In considering a motion for summary judg-
ment, the court must "view the factual record in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment is sought" and "draw all factual inferences
in favor of that party." Id.
139. Id. (discussing district court conclusions about defendants' media and
government reports).
140. See id. at 208 (quoting Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d 236, 253 (1999)).
141. See id. (discussing district court ruling).
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The Second Circuit discussed two problems concerning the
district court's reliance on the defendants' documents.1 42 First, the
defendants' documents lacked scientific knowledge that the Land-
fill caused cancer. 143 The majority determined that even though
the defendants sought summary judgment against the plaintiffs, the
district court did not view the defendants' documents in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs." 44 The Second Circuit also noted
that the absence of scientific reports linking the Landfill to cancer
contributed to the defendants' insistence that the 42 U.S.C. § 9658
reasonably-should-have-"known" standard could be satisfied by
showing reasonable "suspicion."' 4 5
Second, in determining the date that the plaintiffs "reasonably
should have known" the cause of their injuries, the Second Circuit
criticized the district court for not considering the entire record.' 46
The Second Circuit noted that the district court failed to consider
the plaintiffs' evidence." 47 For example, the majority learned that
the district court did not take into account 1991 studies that gave
no reason to suspect that the Landfill caused cancer. 148 Moreover,
publicity surrounding the 1991 reports and subsequent state and
federal government studies reported no link between cancer and
the Landfill."49 The court determined that notice of controversy
142. See id. (noting difficulties with district court ruling).
143. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 208. The defendants submitted an October 11,
1988 DEC letter to "Concerned Citizen [s]" stating that the Landfill's low radiation
levels did "not present any immediate threat to public health." Id. In addition, the
defendants submitted statements from news articles. See id. On October 14, 1988,
a Buffalo News article stated that "radiation levels" at the Pfohl Landfill, according
to DOH and DEC, "pose[d] no threat to the public." Id. In The Buffalo News on
November 2, 1989, a State expert explained that radiation risks from the Pfohl
Landfill were "'very, very minimal.'" Id. In The Buffalo News on March 30, 1980,
the DEC stated that radiation exposure on the site "'present[ed] little, if any, pub-
lic health hazard."' Id. On November 15, 1990, The Buffalo News described that no
health threat was found in Pfohl Road soil tests. See id.
144. See id. (discussing district court's ruling).
145. See id. (noting nature of articles and reports).
146. See id. (relating problems with district court ruling).
147. See id. at 208-09 (discussing importance of considering plaintiffs'
evidence).
148. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 209. In addition, Dr. Melius, the director of the
DOH division, stated in his affidavit that he gave local residents many explanations
for the increased cancer rates, including "socioeconomic factors, improved screen-
ing practices, personal lifestyle and medical history." Id. In meetings with re-
sidents, DOH members never told the public that the area cancers were related to
the Landfill. Id.
149. See id. In the Cheektowaga Times on December 2, 1993, an article stated
how "ground water surrounding the Pfohl Brothers dump ha[d] turned up clean
in all studies performed so far." Id. On August 26, 1994, The Buffalo News reported
that "two studies by federal and state agencies refute[d] charges that contamina-
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was not the standard for determining the FRCD. 150 The record did
not authorize the district court to determine that "no reasonable
factfinder could fail to infer that [the] plaintiffs reasonably should
have known prior to the end of 1991 that the Landfill was the cause
of the injuries." 151 State agencies did not find the Landfill carcino-
genic and State officials assured residents through reports and
meetings that it was not.152 The Second Circuit, therefore, con-
cluded that the public should not have known otherwise.' 53
C. The Length of the Limitations Period
The plaintiffs also argued that the district court incorrectly
ruled that a one-year limitations period governed their survival
claims. 154 The plaintiffs discussed elliptical district court statements
of the FRCD's effect.155 The Second Circuit found that the district
court applied the correct principle. 156 The appellate court empha-
sized how "the FRCD preempts a more restrictive state law only with
respect to the date on which a claim accrues, not with respect to the
length of the limitations period."' 57 The majority then asserted
that New York law controls the length of the limitations period.158
Section 214-c gives a claimant one year from the discovery-of-cause
date to commence a lawsuit or, if longer, three years from the dis-
covery-of-injury date.159
tion from the Pfohl Brothers dump in Cheektowaga . . .caused serious health
problems." Id. In addition, an August 1994 USATSDR report found "no apparent
public health hazard at the present time." Id.
150. See id. at 210 (explaining standards for determining FRCD).
151. Id. (discussing impact of record on district court decision).
152. See id. (noting that State officials assured residents through reports and
meetings, and that State agencies did not find Landfill carcinogenic).
153. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 210 (noting Second Circuit conclusion).
154. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' length of limitations period argument).
155. See id. According to the court, such statements only indicated that the
"effect of the FRCD, where suit was not brought within three years of the discovery-
of-injury date, is to allow a [party] to bring suit within one year after discovery of
the cause of an injury, even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of
the injury." Id. at 211.
156. See id. (describing how court interprets district court opinion).
157. See id. at 210 (noting how FRCD preempts more restrictive state law); 42
U.S.C. § 9658(a) (1) (2000) (stating that "if the applicable [state law or common
law] limitations period .. .provides a commencement date which is earlier than
the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the
federally required commencement date in lieu of the [state law] date").
158. SeeFreier, 303 F.3d at 210 (noting that New York law controls with respect
to length of limitations period).
159. See id. (explaining function of section 214-c).
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D. The Holding
The Second Circuit found the parties' arguments on appeal
meritless, except for the plaintiffs' argument that "genuine issues of
material fact precluded the granting of summary judgment."160
The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion.1 6 1 The court also awarded
costs to the plaintiffs.' 62
E. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge Leval stated that "the scien-
tific knowledge proviso of section 214-c(4) is incompatible with the
FRCD, and that the majority's discussion of the various possible
meanings of the proviso is therefore superfluous."1 63 Judge Leval
agreed with the majority that section 214-c satisfied FRCD require-
ments by providing a party one year from the discovery-of-cause
date to commence a lawsuit or, if longer, three years from the dis-
covery-of-injury date. 164
To qualify for section 214-c(4)'s discovery-of-cause accrual
date, Judge Leval stated that a claimant must satisfy two conditions:
(1) the discovery-of-cause must have occurred less than five years
after discovery-of-injury and (2) the claimant must satisfy the scien-
tific knowledge proviso. 165 This proviso requires a party to show
that "'technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information
sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discov-
ered within three years of discovering the injury.'"166 Claimants
who fail to make this showing must comply with section 214-c(2)'s
limitations period, which is unlawful under the FRCD because its
accrual date is earlier than any allowed by the federal statute. 167
Judge Leval noted that the majority opinion recognized this situa-
tion when it stated, "'To the extent.., that the scientific-knowledge
provision of CPLR section 214-c(4) imposes an accrual date earlier
than the date on which a [claimant] knew or reasonably should
160. Id. at 211 (addressing court conclusions).
161. See id. (noting that court vacated judgment and remanded case).
162. See id. (discussing majority opinion).
163. Freier, 303 F.3d at 211 (Leval, J., concurring) (noting concurring judge's
disagreement with majority opinion).
164. See id. (Leval, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority opinion).
165. See id. (Leval, J., concurring) (discussing section 214-c(4)'s discovery-of-
cause accrual date).
166. Id. at 211-12 (Leval, J., concurring) (defining scientific knowledge
proviso).
167. See id. at 212 (Leval, J., concurring) (explaining that section 214-c(2)'s
limitations period is unlawful).
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have known the cause of the injury, it is . . . preempted by the
FRCD.' ,,168 Judge Leval found the majority's discussion of the New
York Legislature's intended meaning of the scientific knowledge
provision useless. 169
V. CITIcAL ANALYSIS
A. "Reasonable Suspicion" Standard
In Freier, the Second Circuit compared the defendants' evi-
dence of publicity and warnings and the plaintiffs' evidence of offi-
cial reassurances. 170  The majority analyzed the evidence to
determine whether the plaintiffs' claims were "time-barred on the
ground that there was no genuine issue of fact to be tried as to the
date on which their claims accrued under the FRCD."'1 71 The Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion is internally consistent in its FRCD discus-
sion. 172 Nevertheless, the court's conclusions are distinguishable
from the district court and prior cases. 173 The district court found
that the public controversy and government reports concerning the
Landfill's health hazards created a "reasonable suspicion" as to the
cause of their cancer before the end of 1991.174 Additionally, the
district court concluded that the plaintiffs unsuccessfully showed
"why it was not possible to obtain a 'scientific' opinion similar to the
one contained in the Rigle-Sawyer Report" before 1994.175
The Second Circuit determined that the district court incor-
rectly attributed a "reasonable suspicion" standard to the FRCD. 176
The Second Circuit also established that the FRCD's discovery-of-
cause standard should center on "knowledge, actual or imputed,
not on suspicion. ' 177 By differentiating "reasonably should have
known" from "reasonably should have suspected," the Second Cir-
168. Freier, 303 F.3d at 212 (LevalJ., concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
169. See id. (Leval,J., concurring) (evaluating substance of majority opinion).
170. See id. at 207-10 (discussing evidence reviewed by Second Circuit).
171. Id. at 205 (noting issue of case and prior procedural determinations).
172. For a narrative analysis of the Freier decision, see supra notes 107-69 and
accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of CERCLA and the statutory and judicial background
of section 309 (42 U.S.C. § 9658), see supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
174. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 205 (describing findings of district court).
175. Id. (furthering explanation of legal standards applied by district court).
176. See id. (noting district court interpretation of FRCD).
177. Id. (describing focus of FRCD).
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cuit clarified the standards for when claims accrue under the
FRCD.' 78
The majority justifiably distinguished past cases that used a
"reasonable suspicion" standard to determine when a person "rea-
sonably knows" about an injury. 179 For example, in F.P. Woll & Co.,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
the former landowner's motion for summary judgment because the
purchaser knew that a government agency "suspected" previous te-
nants of contaminating property for two years prior to filing a com-
plaint.'80 In addition, the District Court for the Central District of
California in O'Connor concluded that a person "reasonably knows"
about an injury and its cause when he or she "reasonably suspects"
an injury and its cause. 181
The Second Circuit correctly interpreted the FRCD. 182 The
court stated that "[t]he discovery-of-cause standard set by the
FRCD, defined as 'the date the [claimant] knew (or reasonably
should have known) that the personal injury' was caused or contrib-
uted to by the hazardous materials, focuses on knowledge, actual or
imputed, not on suspicion."' 8 3 This FRCD interpretation is consis-
tent with established rules of statutory construction because it pro-
vides a basis for ruling "as a matter of law that the claimant
'reasonably should have known"' the cause of the injury. 184 Thus,
although contrary to other court holdings, the Second Circuit prop-
erly interpreted the FRCD.' 85
178. See id. at 206 (noting FRCD standards); O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc.,
92 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 n.19 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing "reasonably should
have known" and "reasonably should have suspected" standards).
179. See O'REILLY & BUENGER, supra note 7, § 9:17 (comparing "reasonably
should have known" and "reasonably should have suspected" standards).
180. See F.P. Woll & Co. v. Fifth & Mitchell St. Corp., 48 ERC 1362, 1370
(E.D.P.A. 1999) (noting that EPA suspected that operations of former tenants con-
tributed to contamination at site).
181. See O'Connor, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51 (addressing suspicion of cause of
injuries).
182. For a discussion of the judicial background of CERCLA section 309 (42
U.S.C. § 9658), see supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
183. Freier, 303 F.3d at 205 (discussing definition of FRCD discovery-of-cause
standard).
184. Id. at 206 (noting consistency with statutory construction rules).
185. For a discussion of the judicial background of CERCLA section 309 (42
U.S.C. § 9658), see supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
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B. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge Leval found the scientific
proviso of CPLR section 214-c(4) incompatible with the FRCD.18 6
Furthermore, the concurrence noted that the "majority's discussion
of the various possible meanings of the proviso" was superfluous.1 8 7
Despite Judge Leval's concurrence, the majority's discussion of the
different possible meanings of the scientific knowledge proviso has
merit.188 In the majority's view, the district court's interpretation
that a claimant must show that a cause of injury "could not have
been" determined within three years after the discovery-of-injury
date did not match the statutory language.18 9 The majority's discus-
sion of the New York Legislature's official commentary revealed
that the Legislature "apparently intended [that] the test should be:
Was the requisite scientific knowledge reasonably available to the
[claimant] during the three-year discovery period?" 90
The majority correctly recognized that the FRCD requires state
law toxic tort claims to not accrue before a claimant knows or rea-
sonably should know the cause of injury. 19 1 The distinction be-
tween the "could not have been" and "reasonably available"
standard was relevant to determine that Congress did not intend
what a claimant "reasonably should know" to mean information
available only through expensive commissioned studies. 192 The ma-
jority's analysis of CPLR section 214-c(4) provided a "correct inter-
pretation of that section" because it was consistent with legislative
history. 193
VI. IMPACT
Although CERCLA provides a necessary legislative framework
to clean up hazardous waste sites, congressional intent with respect
to specific CERCLA provisions remains unclear and highly liti-
186. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 211-12 (Leval, J., concurring) (stating concurring
opinion).
187. Id. (Leval, J., concurring) (comparing majority opinion and concurring
opinion).
188. For a narrative analysis of the Freier decision, see supra notes 107-69 and
accompanying text.
189. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 206 (discussing district court's interpretation of
statute).
190. Id. at 207 (discussing New York Legislature's official commentary).
191. See id. at 207 (acknowledging FRCD requirements for state law toxic tort
claims).
192. See id. at 206 (discussing relevance of "could not have been" and "reason-
ably available" standard).
193. Id. (noting majority's interpretation of CPLR section 214-c(4)).
[Vol. XV: p. 41
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss1/2
2004] THE TICK OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CLOCK 65
gated. 194 State law accrual dates, formulated when mass exposure
to environmental toxins was unforeseen, generally work against vic-
tims of hazardous substance exposure. 195 The FRCD, however, "en-
visions the . . . viability of state remedies for environmental
injuries," while ensuring that restrictive state limitation statutes do
not cause injured parties to forfeit their CERCLA claims. 196
The Freier decision further supports the contention that the
FRCD provides a uniform standard for determining accrual dates
due to hazardous substance exposure under 42 U.S.C. § 9658.197 In
Freier, the Second Circuit rejected the "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard maintained in past cases. 198 Instead, the majority properly
concluded that 'reasonable suspicion' is not sufficient to find that a
claimant 'reasonably should have known' that hazardous substance
exposure caused their injury.199 This FRCD interpretation will
likely "reduce the burden on innocent parties" under CERCIA.200
In addition to providing courts with guidance on proper FRCD
interpretation, Freier will likely increase industry compliance with
CERCLA.201 Until Congress enhances CERCLA by resolving ambi-
guities in the statute, judicial interpretations of CERCLA will have
to "promote industry responsibility by forcing potentially liable par-
ties to internalize the costs of toxic waste generation, transportation
and storage. ' 20 2 The Freier decision will also increase the likelihood
that CERCLA remedial action will be taken against hazardous sub-
stance exposures.203
194. See Note, Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1458, 1660 (1986) (describing mixed success of governmental responses to
problems caused by hazardous substance releases).
195. See Chapin, supra note 1, at 129-30 (discussing how tort rules work
against hazardous substance exposure victims).
196. Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 708 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting
importance of § 9658 in CERCLA's regulatory scheme).
197. See Conenello, supra note 64, at 4 (discussing purpose of FRCD).
198. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 205-06 (discussing "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard). For a discussion of the judicial background of CERCLA section 309 (42
U.S.C. § 9658), see supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
199. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 206 (discussing sufficiency of "reasonable
suspicion").
200. Connolly, supra note 44, at 1772 (noting that assessing liability early
reduces innocent parties' burdens).
201. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 194-212 (discussing FRCD interpretation). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 194, at 1660 (discussing CERCLAjudicial interpretations).
202. Note, supra note 194, at 1660-61 (noting ambiguities of CERCLA and
importance of industry responsibility).
203. See generally id. at 1660 (describing options to improve government's re-
cord on compensation and cleanup).
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The court's reasoning in Freier is broad and will affect hazard-
ous waste litigation practice within the Second Circuit's jurisdiction
and other jurisdictions. 20 4 The Second Circuit's interpretation
joins industry, government and public parties in providing a rem-
edy for injuries caused by hazardous substance exposures. 20 5 De-
creasing hazardous waste production should be this country's long-
term environmental goal. 20 6 Present and future generations,
though, will immediately benefit from the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation of the FRCD "reasonably should have known"
standard.207
Karen S. Nabholz
204. For a discussion of CERCLA and the statutory and judicial background
of section 309 (42 U.S.C. § 9658), see supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
For a narrative analysis of the Freier decision, see supra notes 107-69 and accompa-
nying text.
205. See Note, supra note 194, at 1660-61 (addressing importance of industry
responsibility); see also A. Brooke Rubenstein & David Winkowski, Note, A Mine is a
Terrible Thing to Waste: Past, Present and Future Reclamation Efforts to Correct the Envi-
ronmentally Damaging Effects of Coal Mines, 13 ViL. ENVWL. L.J. 189, 215 (2002)
(describing environmental goals of community).
206. See Connolly, supra note 44, at 1774 (discussing efforts to clean up haz-
ardous wastes).
207. See Spear, supra note 1, at 150-51 (describing congressional goals of pro-
tecting present and future generations from exposure to toxic hazards). For a
narrative analysis of the Freier decision, see supra notes 107-69 and accompanying
text.
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